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This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the use of performance targets in executive remuneration 
plans and its difficulty and attainability relative to past, expected and realised performance. From 31 
December 2002, UK firms are required under the Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations 
(DRRR) 2002 to disclose performance targets and benchmarks used in executive remuneration plans 
in the Remuneration Report. This study uses the first instance of the disclosure of the targets and 
benchmark from the financial year 2002/3 for a sample of 1269 plans from 440 largest UK firms. 
Results indicate that earnings per share (eps) and total shareholder return (TSR) are the two most 
popular performance measures used in long term remuneration plans, while most firms provide vague 
information regarding performance measures in short-term (annual bonus) plans. More firms are using 
long term incentive plans (LTIPs) in place of share option plans relative to observations made by 
Conyon et al (2000). Plans that use eps as a performance measure often benchmark against growth 
relative to the retail price index (RPI) while plans that use TSR often benchmark against a peer group. 
For a sub-sample of 291 plans using eps as a performance measure, target attainability is analysed 
relative to past, forecasted and realised eps growth. Results indicate that targets set in executive 
remuneration contracts are highly attainable, with targets being met six times out of ten. The use of 
lower and upper threshold targets help control attainability, but less than half of plans specify an 





The use of performance targets in executive remuneration plans in the UK were first 
suggested by Greenbury (1995) in the Greenbury Report on Executive Remuneration, and has 
become a common feature of both share option and other share-based long term incentive 
plans (LTIPs). However, it was only since 2002, after the enforcement of the Directors‟ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) (2002) that firms were required to disclose 
performance measures, targets and related benchmarks to their shareholders. Prior to its 
enforcement, performance levels against which executives were assessed as part of their 
remuneration payout was highly opaque (Bruce, Buck & Main, 2005). The introduction of the 
mandatory remuneration report in annual reports of firms has shed some light on the target 
setting process at the executive level of UK firms.  
While Greenbury (1995) posited that performance targets would increase the 
sensitivity of pay to performance, this hinges on the targets being set at an appropriate level 
of difficulty. Targets that are difficult to attain may demotivate managers, where as targets 
that are highly attainable would reward managers for subpar performance, thereby allowing 
them to extract rent from the shareholders. Using data from the remuneration reports of a 
sample of 440 UK firms, I examine the level of attainability of targets set in executive 
remuneration plans during 2002 and 2003.  
The key research question in this study is: How attainable are the targets set in 
executive remuneration plans? Halliwell Consulting (2004) report that while analysts 
predicted a median three-year EPS growth of 38% for FTSE 100 firms in 2004/2005, less 
than 2% of firms set targets that exceed this forecasted growth. I examine target attainability 
relative to past and predicted future performance. As part of my analysis, I also present 
descriptive evidence on current executive remuneration plans in use in UK firms, updating 
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the research by Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Conyon, Peck, Read and Sadler (2000) who 
studied UK executive remuneration plans in 1997. In particular I provide a descriptive 
analysis of the performance measures and targets used in executive remuneration plans. Pass, 
Robinson and Ward (2000) found accounting earnings based (e.g. earnings per share) and 
market returns based (e.g. total shareholder returns) measures to be the most common 
performance metrics employed in executive remuneration plans between 1994 and 1998. I 
extend their analysis by documenting both the performance measures used in remuneration 
plans in 2002 and the targets and benchmarks used in conjunction with these metrics.  
Existing descriptive studies on the structure of executive remuneration contracts in the 
UK focus on two main issues: the level of executive remuneration (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; 
Conyon, Gregg & Machin, 1995) and the types of executive reward schemes used in 
remuneration packages for top executives (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Conyon et al, 2000; 
Eicholtz, Kok & Otten, 2004).
 1
 These studies find that UK executives are rewarded using a 
mixture of base salary, short-term bonuses and long-term share-based rewards, and that 
remuneration practices vary by industry (Eicholtz et al, 2004; Stathoupoulos, Espenalaub & 
Walker, 2004) and firm size (Cordeiro & Veliyath, 2003). In contrast, there exists limited 
evidence concerning the detailed provisions of executive remuneration arrangements, 
including the performance measures employed, the performance targets set and the 
benchmarks against which actual performance is assessed.  
My descriptive analysis is based on 1269 individual remuneration plans, consisting of 
annual bonus plans, share option plans, long-term incentive plans, and other plans such as 
deferred bonus plans for executive directors from 440 large UK firms. All data are manually 
collected from firms‟ remuneration reports published in the annual report to shareholders for 
                                                          
1
 Common examples of remuneration plans include annual bonus plans, long term incentive plans, share option 
schemes and deferred bonus schemes. 
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the fiscal year 2002/2003 (firms reporting on 31 December 2002 and onwards). I find that eps 
growth and total shareholder return are the two most popular performance measures 
employed in long-term executive remuneration plans. Earnings per share growth targets are 
typically expressed relative to growth in the retail price index (RPI) while total shareholder 
return (TSR) targets are typically benchmarked against the performance of a chosen peer 
group of companies. In contrast, for more short-term plans such as annual bonus plans, 
qualitatively expressed performance measures such as “strategic goals” and “pre-set targets” 
are often employed. Disclosures relating to these performance measures are often vague and 
unspecific, as the requirements of the DRRR (2002) do not extend to annual bonus plans.   
In analysing target attainability, I focus on 291 plans that employ earnings per share 
(eps) growth as a performance measure benchmarked against RPI. Plan inception dates range 
between January 1994 and December 2002. I find median three-year eps growth targets are 
set at a rate that is lower than both past performance and forecasted performance (from 
I/B/E/S) at the plan inception date and in five of the seven years in which plans were 
introduced, average actual performance exceeded the lower target bound.
2
  I also find that eps 
growth targets are set at similar levels in both share option plans and LTIPs, and across all 
plans, upper threshold targets are achieved for every six plans out of ten.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical background of the paper, findings of prior research and the motivation behind this 
study. This is followed by the sample and data collection process and the descriptive analysis. 
Discussion of target attainability follows, and the final section concludes.  
 
                                                          
2
 Firms often set targets that consist of a lower bound (lower threshold) and an upper bound (upper threshold), 
with the former being the minimum achievement required to trigger rewards, and the latter being the maximum 
level of achievement that is rewarded.  
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2. Theory, Prior Research and Motivation 
The separation of ownership and control observable in firms today requires 
remuneration contracts written in such a way to encourage executives to act in the best 
interest of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To better link executive pay with 
firm performance, an increasing proportion of executive remuneration is being tied to the 
attainment of pre-specified targets based on agreed-upon performance measures (Conyon et 
al 2000; Eicholtz et al 2004; Pass et al, 2000). In this section, I discuss the theory behind 
setting performance targets, followed by an examination of existing evidence on performance 
measures and targets in executive remuneration contracts. 
 
2.1 Performance measures and target setting 
In choosing appropriate performance measures for executive remuneration plans, 
Miller (2004) suggests that performance measures should be linked to shareholder value 
creation; aligned with company strategy and reflects operating performance; emphasise 
objective and quantifiable measures, and balance growth and returns. To that end, financial 
measures are most commonly used as they are seen to be objective, quantifiable and have a 
direct link to shareholder value (Miller, 2004).  
It is common practise to express performance measures in either accounting or 
market-based terms, and this practise is advocated in various discussions of executive 
remuneration best practise by Coyle (2005) and Reda, Reifler and Thatcher (2004). 
Empirically, Sloan (1993) argues for the primacy of accounting earnings over market-based 
measures in executive remuneration contracts, as accounting-based measures better shield 
executives from market noise. Firms tend to use share prices as a measure of firm 
performance against which executives are assessed, but Lambert and Larcker (1987) concede 
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that the use of only market-based measure is insufficient for performance evaluation 
purposes. It is common therefore to observe executive remuneration packages utilising both 
accounting- and market-based performance measures, as discussed by Coyle (2005) and Reda 
et al (2004), and as evidenced by Pass et al (2000).  
Targets, meanwhile, are set at a level that best maximises their motivation potential to 
elicit the best performance from the executives.  Summarising the literature on target setting, 
Bobko and Collella (1994) conclude that individuals who work towards difficult, specific 
targets perform better than those who work towards easy, vague goals. Defining „difficult‟, 
however, is a subjective process. Stedry (1960) conducted experiments examining the impact 
of varying levels of goal difficulty on performance. He observed that goals that were set at 
„medium‟ and „high‟ difficulty levels induced better performance than goals that were set at 
the „loose‟ level. Dunbar (1971) tried to find an optimal level of difficulty using the 
definitions of difficulty employed by Stedry and Kay (1966) and Stedry (1962), and proposed 
that targets be set at a level that is „difficult but attainable‟. This is defined as targets that are 
achieved less than 40% of the time. Kenis (1979) corroborates Stedry (1960) in his study of 
169 plant managers, finding that the motivation derived from budget targets increased and 
then decreased as the goal difficulty ranged from „about right‟ to „tight but attainable‟ to „too 
tight, with the optimal level of difficulty lying in the „tight but attainable range‟. 3  
                                                          
3
 The main criticism of the above studies lies in the subjectivity of the metric used to measure difficulty. 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) express concern at the issue of subjectivity when reviewing evidence of target 
difficulty levels set by firms. A multitude of factors could affect the employee‟s perception of target difficulty. 
Moussa (1996) for instance, found that self-esteem affected how participants in his study viewed difficulty 
levels. He found that participants who had higher self-esteem would consistently choose more difficult targets 
under a piece-rate scheme than a flat rate performance scheme. Conversely, participants with low self-esteem 
did not have a preferred payment scheme, underlining the argument that monetary motivation has little impact 
on participants who view the task as unattainable (Lawler, 1973). However, Bobko and Colella (1994) argue 
that the perception of difficulty that matters belongs to the person upon whom the target is set, and therefore the 
metric used is appropriate as a target of 3% growth, for instance, could be „easy‟ for one employees, but „tight 
but attainable‟ to another. 
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 Stedry and Kay (1966) found that goals perceived as challenging enhanced overall 
performance but this relation was constrained by individual commitment towards the goal. 
This meant that tight or more difficult goals were ineffective if the subject rejected them 
because of a perception that the goal was unattainable. Hofstede (1968) reached a similar 
conclusion based on evidence that budget targets in five large Dutch companies had no 
motivational effect unless they were accepted by the employees. To encourage employees to 
accept targets assigned to them, Kenis (1979) suggested increasing employee participation in 
target setting, which he found increased the likelihood of targets being met. Latham et al 
(1978) conducted an experiment involving a group of engineers and scientists to study the 
role of participation on goal setting, finding that individuals who were allowed to participate 
in the target setting process set higher goals than those who did not. Libby (1999) found that 
increased two-way communication between subordinates and their superiors also leads to 
improved performance.  
 Merchant and Manzoni (1989) however provided evidence that setting highly 
attainable targets may also benefit the firm. Through interviews conducted in fifty-four profit 
centers at twelve different firms, the authors found that ex-ante 87% of managers interviewed 
said they were at least 75% confident that their targets would be achieved; 53% expressed 
90% or more confidence. Ex-post, 74% of the managers achieved or exceeded their budget 
targets, leading the authors to conclude that managers set themselves highly achievable 
budget targets. Follow-up interviews attributed employees‟ target setting behaviour to their 
fiscal needs (securing a higher bonus), their psychological needs (wanting to feel like 
winners) and their practical needs (to allow more operational flexibility and to increase 
autonomy). Their superiors approved of these targets because they believed that attainable 
targets would induce more commitment, and that over-optimistic targets would increase the 
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risk of over-consumption of resources, which in turn could impose significant costs on the 
firm. Also, they also argued that highly achievable targets improved commitment towards the 
goals set, thereby reducing the likelihood that managers would resort to gaming to ensure that 
the targets were achieved. 
Similar evidence at the executive level is scant, although Indjejikian and Nanda 
(2002) studied 4576 executives from 397 US firms using data obtained from remuneration 
consultants for the years 1988-1995. The authors compared target bonus and actual bonus 
payments over two consecutive periods to infer how performance affected subsequent target 
setting.
4
  They found that executives who exceed target bonus in a particular year have a 72% 
chance of exceeding target bonus in the subsequent year, compared with only a 42% chance 
of doing so if they do not achieve target bonus in the first year. These findings suggest that 
performance standards do not fully adjust to reflect past performance, thereby making it 
easier for managers to achieve preset targets. However, a limitation of Indjejikian and Nanda 
(2002) is the unobservability of actual performance targets. The authors instead inferred the 
probabilities of achieving the targets based on targeted and actual bonuses.  
Observations at the operational level are not automatically generalisable to the 
executive level of the organizational hierarchy. Agency problems between operational level 
employees and senior management differ from agency problems between top management 
and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that decision processes that firms 
undertake involve four-stages: initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring. They 
suggest that in order to minimise agency problems, firms should separate decision 
management functions (initiation and implementation) from decision control functions 
(ratification and monitoring). Within a setting where subordinates are answerable to a 
                                                          
4
 Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) define target bonuses as the pre-specified bonus a manager earns for attaining a 
pre-set target. The bonuses may increase or decrease depending on whether actual performance is above or 
below the pre-set target.  
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superior in the organisational hierarchy, the demarcation of these two decision functions is 
clear. In a target setting context, when an employee sets his own target, the target is then 
subject to ratification by a manager or a superior at a higher level in the company. Once the 
target is implemented, management will then monitor the employee‟s performance. 
Accordingly, the employee does not set his or her own target but merely assists in suggesting 
a target level he or she is comfortable with, and which is subject to approval by a more senior 
manager. However, at the senior executive level of the management hierarchy, the ratification 
step is less distinct. Using the Fama and Jensen (1983) four-step process as a framework, the 
board of directors ratifies targets for senior executives. However, since senior management 
are also part of the board, decision management and decision control functions are no longer 
separate, providing an opportunity for managerial opportunism.
5
 
Extant evidence suggests that even with adequate ratification and monitoring systems 
are in place at the operational level, targets are still set at a level that is highly attainable 
(Merchant and Manzoni, 1989). While senior executives are subject to monitoring by various 
stakeholders including non-executive directors, large shareholders, and institutional investors, 
the dynamics of the monitoring relationship differ from that of the subordinate-superior 
relationship observed at lower levels of the firms. Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) found past 
executive performance was discounted when setting new targets, making them more 
attainable, which suggests (at least empirically) that more lax ratification and monitoring 
systems at the executive level could lead to the setting of highly attainable targets. Other 
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 Popular press provides evidence of opportunistic managerial behaviour while setting targets. Feisst (2006) 
reports on shareholders of Compass plc exhibiting their disapproval of management increasing executive pay 
without proportionately increasing target levels. Vodafone plc shareholders, meanwhile, expressed their 
intention to vote against a remuneration scheme that is lowering targets in order to make them more achievable 
(Wachman, 2006). Consulting firm Haliwell pointed out in their report that shareholder approval of executive 




evidence for executive level targets is limited, and this paper seeks to shed further light on 
this issue.  
3.0 Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample 
 The initial sample consists of 1857 executive remuneration plans from 440 large UK 
firms as at 1 January 2003. From this initial sample, I excluded remuneration plans that were 
designed for specific purposes (e.g. golden hello plans) and remuneration plans that were no 
longer active. To allow comparability and better analysis, I also excluded multi-tier plans, 
which are plans that have separate targets for every board member. A remainder of 1269 
plans were employed for the descriptive analysis. A further subset of 291 plans which 
employed earnings per share (eps) as performance measures were used for the attainability 
analysis.  
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
3.2 Plan Types and Data Collection 
For the purpose of this study, I characterise executive remuneration plans into four 
groups. Plans that pay out a specified bonus on an annual basis, often (but not always) subject 
to the attainment of a pre-specified target are categorised as annual bonus plans, and this 
constitutes 34% of the sample. Plans that grant share options to executives, regardless of 
whether they are exercisable subject to attainment of a pre-specified target or not, are 
categorised as share option plans, and make up 38% of the sample. Plans that are grants of 
cash or shares with performance conditions that are evaluated over a period of greater than 
one year (but do not involve the award of options) are categorised as long term incentive 
plans (LTIPs), and they consist of 23% of the sample. For plans in the sample that were 
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labelled in the remuneration report as LTIPs but involve the award of share options, these 
were classified as share option plans for the purpose of this study. Plans that do not fit into 
any of the above categories are denoted as Other plans, and make up 5% of the sample. These 
include deferred bonus plans, share price improvement plans, warrants schemes and deferred 
short-term incentive plans.  
For each of the above plans, the following information is obtained from the 
remuneration report. Performance measures, which are the specific criteria against which 
executives are assessed, are categorised into either accounting-based, market-based or other 
targets, which include targets that involve strategic goals or physical sales targets. 
Accounting measures are then further refined into earnings per share (eps), net asset value 
(NAV), or other measures, which include economic value added (EVA™) , sales or return on 
equity. Market based measures are categorised as either share price, total shareholder return 
or other market measures, such as market capitalisation. Performance targets are goals based 
on the performance measures that executives have to achieve in order to gain the associated 
rewards. For some plans, performance targets are defined with thresholds, where a range of 
performance is specified. The lower (upper) threshold is the minimum (maximum) attainment 
that would trigger the lowest (highest) level of rewards. These targets are measured against 
certain standards, which are referred to as benchmarks. Benchmarks are classified into 
growth relative to RPI, peer group, budgeted performance, growth and other measures, which 
includes items such as option values, overall market performance, long term rates of return 
and internally generated formulas. Performance periods are specified as months or years over 
which the performance is assessed. This is typically one year for annual bonus plans, and 
tends to vary between three to seven years for other plans. Rewards are the payout executives 
receive on attainment of the target, and are categorised as either being cash based or share 
based. In addition to the above, any other relevant information was also collected. This 
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includes information such as caps on annual bonus plans, severance payments made to 
directors and penalties for non-performance.  
 
4.0 Descriptive Evidence and Plan Structure 
4.1 Plans 
 A total of 440 firms were analysed, and the mean (median) firm has 2.89 (3) plans. 
All firms operate at least one executive remuneration plan, and the maximum number of 
plans operated by a firm during 2002/2003 is seven (Chrysalis plc, which operates one annual 
bonus scheme, two operational share option schemes, two LTIPs and two other schemes for 
which minimal information is disclosed).  
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents a frequency count of the number of active plans 
employed by firms. Of the 440 firms in the sample, thirteen (3%) do not operate an annual 
bonus plan, 422 (96%) operate a single annual bonus plan and five (1%) operate two annual 
bonus plans. For long-term plans, sixty two firms (14%) do not operate a share option plan, 
relative to 203 firms (46%) that do not operate LTIPs. Most firms operate at least one share 
option or LTIP plan, with 294 firms (67%) for share options and 186 firms (42%) for LTIPs. 
Eighty-four firms (19%) operate more than two share option plans, while the equivalent 
proportion for LTIPs is fifty-one firms (12%). As share option plans and LTIPs have a longer 
time frame of performance, I observe that firms operate two or more share option plans and / 
or LTIPs at the same time. In most cases, these are overlaps, where firms introduce new plans 
before the older plan has fully lapsed.  
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 Panel B of Table 2 presents the number of plans employed by firms for the largest 200 
firms in the sample and the smaller 240 firms, providing data hat is on a similar scale to 
Conyon et al. (2000) for comparison purposes. Conyon et al. (2000) report that 99% of the 
200 largest UK firms in 1997 operate share option schemes. In my sample, the percentage of 
firms that operate at least one share option plan is 86%, and 82% of the largest 200 UK firms 
in the sample. The decrease in the use of share option plans can be contrasted with the 
increase of the use in LTIPs, where the percentage of firms operating LTIPs in 1997 was 
50%, and 54% of all firms and 66% of the top 200 firms in 2002. Whether LTIPs substitute 
for share option plans in the UK is an interesting question worthy of a longitudinal study. 
Conyon et al. (2000) find a substitution effect of LTIPs on share option plans, confirming 
Buck et al. (2003) who argue that LTIPs were often introduced as a replacement for 
unconditional share option plans.  
4.2 Performance Measures and Benchmarks 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 Table 3 reports the number of performance measures used in executive remuneration 
plans. Despite strong recommendations from Greenbury (1995) and subsequently the 
Combined Code (2001) that performance measures be attached to executive remuneration 
plans, from Panel A I observe that eighty plans (6%) – one annual bonus plan, thirty-one 
share option plans, twenty-seven LTIPs and twenty-one Other Plans - do not use performance 
measures.
6
 A total of 993 plans (389 annual bonus plans, 387 share option plans, 192 LTIPs 
and thirty-four Other Plans) used one performance measure, while 122 plans (thirteen annual 
bonus plans, 48 share option plans, 56 LTIPs and five Other Plans).  
                                                          
6
 The only annual bonus plan that does not employ a performance measure is a profit-sharing based annual 
bonus plan with no particular targets or measures in place, operated by Rathbone plc 
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It is particularly interesting to observe LTIPs with no performance measure, as the 
defining characteristic of LTIPs is that they are remuneration schemes with attached 
performance measures (in contrast to share option plans, which traditionally were not subject 
to performance measures in order to vest). Further investigation revealed that LTIPs with no 
performance conditions attached are share matching or restricted share plans. Both these 
plans are associated with other plans for which performance targets have already been 
achieved, and therefore no additional performance measures are attached to these plans.  
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Table 4 presents the different types of performance measures used in executive 
remuneration plans, by plan type. Results are based on 1,391 observations from 1,269 plans 
as some plans use more than one performance measure. The DRRR(2002) requires firms to 
disclose performance measures used in the Remuneration Report for all long term plans – 
annual bonus plans are exempt from this requirement although some firms still choose to 
disclose performance measures and / or targets for annual bonus plans. I observe seventy-four 
plans (6%) merely disclose the use of a performance measure, but either provide vague or no 
details pertaining to the nature of the measure used. Of these plans, twenty-nine are annual 
bonus plans, but the remaining forty-five are long term remuneration plans.  
Accounting-based performance measures are most frequently employed with 53% of 
plans using such measures, relative to only 22% using market-based measures. Drawing upon  
Sloan (1993), this preference for accounting-based measures can be explained by the fact that 
they better shield executives from changes in firm value that they are unable to influence, 
thereby helping to ensure that they are not punished (or rewarded) for changes in value that 
are beyond their direct control. A more cynical explanation for the preference of accounting-
based measures over market-based measures is that they are more easily manipulated by 
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management (Healy, 1985; Gaver, Gaven & Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan, 
1995).   
The type of plan and the time horizon related to the plans influence the type of 
performance measures used and the amount of information disclosed. For short-term plans, 
especially annual bonuses, firms prefer to use qualitative targets. The most popular targets are 
qualitative accounting related targets, such as cost reduction or business plan targets (24%) 
and profit and earnings targets (18%). However, little detail is provided beyond these vague 
statements.  Of the firms in the sample, 61% also do not disclose benchmarks related to the 
targets in annual bonus plans. This may be related to the stipulations of the DRRR(2002) 
which does not require mandatory disclosure of performance benchmarks for short term 
plans.  
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
For long term plans, eps (58%) was the most popular measure employed in share 
options plans while TSR (44%) was the most popular measure employed in LTIPs. This is 
consistent with the observation made by Conyon et al (2000) for 114 CEO share option plans, 
and Stathopoulos, Espenlaub and Walker (2004). Table 5 presents the performance 
benchmarks used in executive remuneration plans. For plans that use eps, the most common 
benchmark is growth relative to RPI (74%), while plans that use TSR are commonly 
benchmarked against a peer group (88%). Peer groups are also popular among plans that use 
net asset value (NAV) and share price as performance measures. In contrast, only 3% of 
plans that use eps as a performance measure benchmark against peer groups, and 1% of plans 
that use TSR as a performance measure benchmark against growth in RPI. Pass, Ward and 
Robinson (2000) document that most eps-based plans benchmark against growth relative to 
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the RPI while most TSR-based plans benchmark against peer groups, for a small sample of 
firms in 1997. Further analysis on the use of peer groups is provided in Section 4.3. 
The explanation behind this casual causality may be rooted in practicality rather than 
theory. While Holmstrom (1979) suggests that firm performance is best measured relative to 
the performance of others, there is no clear theoretical motivation to suggest that plans which 
use eps as a performance measure should be measured relative to growth in RPI rather than 
against the performance of its peers. I propose three possible practical explanations behind 
the observations. First, this may be a result of „copycat‟ practices, whereby with the 
availability of information on remuneration plans in the public domain, firms use other firms‟ 
plan structures as a basis to construct and subsequently legitimise their own plans. Second, 
the use of outside advisors such as remuneration consultants may also be a contributory 
factor, as advisor may propose similar plans to its clients. Thirdly, suggestions made in 
corporate governance codes may also influence what firms believe to be best practise. For 
instance, Greenbury (1995) suggests that LTIPs (for which TSR is the most popular 
performance measure used) in particular be benchmarked against “a variable, or set of 
variables, reflecting the company‟s objectives” (Greenbury, 1995: pp 43), specifically 
mentioning total shareholder return while alluding that other measures are also acceptable. 
Firms could be using TSR as the performance measure for LTIPs as a way to show they are 
complying with the Combine Code recommendations. 
Comparing these observations with those of Conyon et al (2000), annual bonus plans, 
share option plans and LTIPs remain the most popular methods of linking executive pay to 
performance. I observe an increase in the popularity of LTIPs relative to 1997, and a decrease 
in the use of share option plans. As the use of these particular three plans are advocated in 
codes of best practise and guidance notes by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), 
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Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) and the National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF), I do not expect the pattern to change.  
 
4.3 Additional Evidence on Peer Groups 
 While the DRRR (2002) requires firms to disclose details of peer groups used as 
performance benchmarks, it provides no guidance or stipulations on peer group member 
choice. It is therefore the onus of individual firms to identify appropriate peer groups, and 
ultimately to shareholders to question how firms define who their peers are.  
 The use of peer groups is supported by theory and practise. Comparing performance 
relative to a group of peer firms strips out unwanted market noise and provides a cleaner 
measure of performance (Holmstrom, 1979). However, the choice of an appropriate peer 
group can be complex. If peer groups were bound geographically (so that they would all face 
similar economic conditions), this would cause problems for firms that operate in a 
specialised industry that do not have peers within its own stock markets, for instance. 
However, choosing a peer from firms that operate in a different country or listed on a 
different stock market may also cause problems due to different currencies, different 
regulations and stock exchange requirements, and different operating environments.  
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
From Table 5, we see that 281 plans are benchmarked against peer groups: eleven 
annual bonus plans, 104 share option plans, 154 LTIP plans and 12 Other plans. Of these, 
37% are benchmarked against a named list of peers. Panel B of Table 6 presents the different 
types of peer groups used by firms. Of all plans that use peer groups as benchmarks, 56% 
benchmark against the constituents of a recognised index, the FTSE indices being most 
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popular. Six plans (2%) that disclose the use of a named peer group (rather than an index) but 
do not actually provide details of the constituents of the peer group, making it hard to 
realistically assess their performance. A further fourteen (5%) only mention that peer groups 
are used, but provide no further details. Theories of relative performance evaluation suggest 
that peer groups eliminate, as much as possible, external noise to allow for cleaner 
performance measures. Whether named peer groups or indices eliminate noise better is an 
interesting issue for future research.  
The complexity in choosing appropriate peers and the geographical dispersion of 
peers can be demonstrated using the peers for Anglo American plc as an example, presented 
in Panel A of Table 6.Anglo American plc is involved in the mining industry, and is listed on 
the London Stock Exchange and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa. Of its 
twelve peers, only seven are involved in the mining industry, and only one company is listed 
on the same stock exchange as Anglo American. Five companies which are designated as 
peers belong to the same broad industry group, but operate in different core businesses, and 
in the case of two firms, are not listed on the same stock exchanges.   
As information relating to peer groups was previously unavailable in earlier annual 
reports, comparisons to earlier periods cannot be made. However, the above analysis sheds 
some light on the usage of peer groups in remuneration contracts. Future research will be able 
to evaluate how these peer groups change over time, as well as being able to look at firm 
characteristics that explain choice of peer group elements and its effects on variable executive 
pay and firm performance.  
5.0 Analysis of Target Difficulty  
 A further analysis of target difficulty and attainability is performed using plans that 
use eps as performance measures. Eps is chosen for two reasons. First, eps figures are an 
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objective measure of performance readily available in the public domain, compared to TSR 
targets which vary in definition and need to be manually calculated. Second, eps targets are 
more likely to have comparable benchmarks relative to TSR targets, as plans that use eps as a 
performance measure are typically benchmarked against growth in RPI, which is both 
objective and readily available. Other the other hand, TSR is typically benchmarked against 
peer group performance, which varies from firm to firm and is therefore harder to estimate. 
 
5.1 Measuring Target Difficulty 
As target difficulty is a subjective concept that differs from one firm to the next and is 
often relative (Bobko & Colella, 1994), I measure difficulty as attainability relative to past, 
forecasted and realised eps growth. Eps targets disclosed by firms in their remuneration 
reports are compared with past performance (past eps), analysts‟ forecasts (expected eps) and 
realised firm performance (realised eps). Past eps, expected eps and realised eps are obtained 
from I/B/E/S. I/B/E/S is used as its eps calculations strip out similar exceptional items to 
those excluded by firms when computing eps before transitory items (Choi, Lin, Walker & 
Young, 2007).  
 In order for meaningful inferences regarding target difficulty to be made all eps 
figures are measured relative to plan inception date, as this is the point where targets are 
initially set. Plan inception dates are manually identified. As remuneration plans are put to 
vote at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), I obtain AGM announcements from Thomson 
Analytical and analyse the resolutions relating to remuneration plans. The dates of the AGM 
where these resolutions are tabled are assumed to be plan inception dates. Eps figures from 
I/B/E/S are defined as follows: 
 Past eps : median eps growth over the preceding three years prior to plan inception 
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Forecasted eps: median analysts‟ forecasts of eps growth for the three years from plan 
inception date. 
Realised eps: Actual eps growth achieved by the firm during the three-year period 
from inception date.  
Detailed I/B/E/S forecasts are used, and in the event that more than one analyst provides a 
forecast, the median forecast is calculated. From the 339 plans that use eps as a performance 
measure and RPI as a benchmark, I omit plans for which past, forecasted and realised 
performance data are unavailable on I/B/E/S, resulting in a final sample of 291 plans for 208 
firms.  
 As eps growth targets are disclosed in remuneration reports with varying time 
horizons, for the purpose of comparability all eps growth targets are expressed in their three-
year equivalents. RPI growth figures are measured using raw RPI figures obtained from the 
National Statistics website.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics  
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 Panel A of Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the eps growth targets in 
relation to past, forecasted and realised eps growth for the sample firms. Sample firms 
operate plans introduced between 1994 and 2003, of which 103 plans (35%) employ both 
lower and upper thresholds. Mean (median) past eps growth is -15.65% (18.87%) with a 
standard deviation of 5.8. Mean (median) for realised eps growth is 122.35% (22.25%) with a 
standard deviation of 14.6. Mean (median) forecasted eps growth is 37.96% (25.6%) with a 
standard deviation of 76.09. The large variance between mean and median indicates extreme 
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observations in the sample, and following from this, median observations are used for further 
analysis. 
The median lower (upper) threshold target set by firms for all years in the sample is 
an eps growth of 15.53% (29.79%) over three years. When contrasted with the median past 
three-year and median forecasted three-year growth of firms in the sample, which are 18.87% 
and 25.6% respectively, it is clear that the median lower threshold is set below both past and 
forecasted eps growth, while the median upper threshold target is set above this.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents a summary of the median eps growth targets and 
performance by year. Over the ten-years studied in the sample, lower threshold eps targets 
have overall increased from 15.3% to 17.48% after adjusting for RPI and have been gradually 
increasing from year to year with 1998 as an exception. No similar trend is observed for 
upper threshold targets, however. In seven years out of ten, the median lower threshold target 
was set lower than past median eps growth; lower than median expected growth in nine years 
out of ten and lower than median realised eps growth for every year realised eps growth was 
positive. The less challenging lower thresholds targets are tempered by more challenging 
upper threshold targets in the event that firms employ them, but this was not a common 
feature of the plans in the sample until 2000.  
This descriptive evidence provides some insight on target difficulty depending on 
how firms structure their targets. Plans that have only one threshold can be said to be more 
attainable than plans that have lower and upper thresholds, as their targets are set lower than 
past and forecasted performance. Plans with both a lower and an upper target threshold also 
provide executives an extra incentive to perform above expectations to realise a higher bonus. 
It was also observed that the median actual eps growth is 22.25%, suggesting that lower 
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target thresholds were achieved, but not upper target thresholds. Therefore the use of upper 
target thresholds increases the difficulty of targets in performance plans.  
Panel C of Table 7 presents the median target difficulty by plan. Lower threshold eps 
growth targets for both share option plans and LTIPs are approximately 15% and statistically 
there is no significant difference between the targets for both types of plans. Upper threshold 
targets in share option plans are slightly lower than those of LTIPs at 26% compared to 32% 
but this difference is also statistically insignificant.
7
 In all cases median lower threshold 
targets have been set lower than median past and forecasted eps growth for both types of 
plans, and median upper threshold targets are set higher than median past and forecasted eps 
growth for both plan types. Median realised performance for both plans lies between the 
lower and upper threshold targets. No particular plan type therefore appears to employ more 
highly attainable targets.   
The budgeting literature suggests that in order to motivate or induce the best 
performance from employees, targets should be set at a level that is “tight but attainable” 
(Kenis, 1979). It has also been established that targets that are viewed as “too difficult” by 
those subject to it decreases incentives to perform (Stedry  & Kay, 1966; Hofstede, 1968). 
Lower and upper threshold targets, if employed properly, could be effectively used to set 
targets that are “tight but attainable”, with a more attainable target to encourage performance 
at the lower threshold, and a tighter target at the upper threshold to reward exceptional 
achievement.  
Target attainment can also be evaluated by looking at how targets have been achieved 
ex-post. The target difficulty findings are also consistent with evidence reported by Halliwell 
Consulting (2004). For UK FTSE 100 firms in 2004/2005, 79% of firms set three-year eps 
                                                          
7
 For both upper and lower target thresholds, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was conducted to assess the 
difference in the medians.  
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growth targets of less than 20% (approximately an annual EPS growth of RPI + 3%). To put 
this into context, Halliwell Consulting (2004) find that analysts predict a median three-year 
EPS growth of 38% but less than 2% of firms in their report set targets that exceed this. 
Results of a similar comparison analysed in this paper is presented in Table 8, where  the 
frequency with which lower and upper threshold targets exceeded past, forecasted and 
realised eps growth are reported. Lower (Upper) threshold targets are set below past 
performance 50% (43%) of the time, and lower than forecasted eps growth 71% (54%) of the 
time. This suggests that ex-ante, more than half of the plans examined in the sample have 
targets that are lower than what they have achieved in the preceding three years, and also 
lower than what analysts expect them to achieve.  
<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
When examining actual eps growth ex-post, it is observed that lower (upper) 
threshold targets are lower than realised performance 63% (66%) of the time, suggesting that 
targets are achieved approximately six times out of ten. 
8
 Dunbar (1971) defines a target as 
difficult if they are attained only 40% of the time and by Merchant and Manzoni (1989) as 
targets that are achieved only 50% of the time. Framing the observations within this context, 
it is clear that targets set are highly attainable.  
At the operational level targets are even more attainable, as evidenced by the findings 
of Merchant and Manzoni (1989) where managers at lower levels of the firm achieved budget 
targets 80% of the time. The difference between target attainment at the operational and 
executive level can be potentially explained by the visibility of executive targets to public 
scrutiny. Operational level targets are usually internal to the firm; whereas executive 
performance (and subsequent rewards post-attainment) covets wide media coverage.  High 
                                                          
8
 There is a difference between the attainment of lower and upper threshold targets as not all firms have upper 
threshold targets, where as all firms have lower threshold targets.  
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media visibility has been documented to possess a disciplining function (Wu, 2004; Anderson 
& Glazer, 1984; Core, Guay & Larcker, 2007) and therefore may be able to discourage 
managers from setting targets that are seen to be too attainable. 
6. Conclusion 
 The aim of this study was two-fold: first to study target setting in an executive-level 
setting in a firm, and second, to present recent descriptive evidence on the structure of 
executive remuneration contracts in UK firms, with a particular emphasis on performance 
measures and targets, which have not yet been thoroughly discussed in the literature before. 
Changes in the UK disclosure requirements regarding executive remuneration have made 
additional data available through remuneration reports which are provided with the firms‟ 
annual reports.   
 I observe that EPS and TSR are the most popular performance measures used by firms 
in executive remuneration plans. EPS growth targets are commonly benchmarked against 
growth in RPI, while TSR are commonly measured relative to the performance of a chosen 
peer group. The analysis, which studies both short term and long term executive 
remuneration plans, also reveals the reluctance of firms to disclose extensive information 
regarding annual bonus plans, which they feel may contain commercially sensitive 
information.  I also present evidence on the types of peer groups that firms use.    
 The descriptive analysis of peer groups presented here provides opportunity for future 
research. In particular, there is opportunity to examine why firms choose a particular type of 
peer group to measure themselves against, and what factors affect this. Also, future research 
could examine the companies firms declare as their peers, and how this compares to common 
perception of who a firm‟s peers are. The availability of actual peer groups would also enable 
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us to examine whether firms practise relative performance evaluation (RPE) without the need 
to use proxies as prior studies have employed. 
 Studying earnings per share growth targets, I find that on average, firms set 
themselves attainable lower-threshold targets, as targets were achieved during all years 
reporting positive growth, with actual performance outperforming lower-threshold targets by 
at least 20%. A selection of plans employs upper-threshold targets, which are not necessarily 
set at a higher level that past or expected performance. Of the seven years for which I have 
actual performance figures, three years recorded achievements that surpassed upper-threshold 
targets.  The observations regarding target difficulty are consistent with the findings of 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989) and Indjejikian and Nanda (2002).  
A key contribution of this paper is an examination of the target setting process at the 
executive level of the firm. Prior literature has primarily been focused on the budgeting 
process which is almost wholly focused on lower levels of the firm. These prior observations 
cannot be generalised to the executive setting, as there exists different organisational 
dynamics at the top and lower levels of the firm. While target-setting at the executive level is 
monitored to a certain extent by non-executive directors or large shareholders, this 
monitoring process is less direct compared to the superior-subordinate relationship at lower 
levels of the firm, and is subject to board-room dynamics that may affect the monitoring 
process in a different way (Hallock, 1997). For example, subordinates would meet their 
superiors quite often, whereas the board only convenes a few times a year and shareholders 
meet management once a year at the Annual General Meeting. In terms of participative goal 
setting processes, at the top level of the firm executives may have more control over their 
targets than employees at lower levels of the firm. However, these are merely conjectures as 
the target setting process at the executive level of the firm is opaque and unobservable. All 
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we see are the end results of the process in the remuneration report which was made 
mandatory only very recently. Until more light is shed on the dynamics of decision making 
and performance target setting at the executive level, generalisations made from observations 
in the budgeting literature risk being inaccurate and misleading. Actual executive target 
setting process in the boardroom is still very much a black box, and in order to better 





 Anatomy of a Performance Measure 
(based on the Classification System employed in the data collection process) 
This is an example of a share option plan that belongs to Crest Nicholson plc.  
The performance criteria requires that, for full vesting to occur, the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) 
of the Company when compared to the TSR of companies in a defined peer group, currently consisting 
of 14 companies in the construction section as set out on page 59, places the Company at or above the 
75
th
 percentile. If the Company is ranked below the 50
th
 percentile no shares vest, with 40% of the 
shares vesting at the 50
th





 percentiles. In addition there is an underlying performance critierion which requires the 
Company’s earnings per share to grow by at least inflation plus 2% per annum over the four year 
performance period. 
From: Crest Nicholson plc Annual Report 2003 
If we were to break down this data into the format that was used to compile this dataset, this would be 
done as follows: 
Plan Type:  
Share Option, One Tier (applies to all members of the board), Current Plan 
Performance Measure Type: 
 For Performance Measure 1: Share Based , Total Shareholder Return 
 For Performance Measure 2: Accounting Based, Earnings Per Share 
Target: 
For Performance Measure 1: Lower threshold – 50th percentile, Upper threshold – 75th 
percentile 
For Performance Measure 2: 2% per annum 
Benchmark:  
 For Performance Measure 1: Peer group (companies disclosed) 
 For Performance Measure 2: RPI / Inflation 
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Sample Selection Filters  
     
Panel A: Firms Omitted      
Initial Number of Firms  500 
less:   
Non-ordinary shares listed 9  
Non-UK domicile 14  
Foreign Currency 10  
Mergers and Acquisitions / Restructuring 17  
Missing Annual Reports 9  
Non-unitary board structure 1 60 
Final Sample  440 
   
    
Panel B: Plans Omitted    
Initial Number of Plans  1857 
less:   
Special purpose plans (golden hellos etc) 7  
Multi-tier plans 244  
Inactive plans 337 588 
Final Sample  1269 
   
The table presents a breakdown of the sample selection process. Panel A presents the filtering process for firms in the 
sample. The initial sample of firms consisted of 500 largest UK firms by market capitalisation as at 31 January 2003. Details 
of reasons for omission are presented, which leaves the final sample at 440 firms. Panel B presents a breakdown of the 
filtering process of plans. Special purpose plans are plans presented as golden hellos or for other recruitment purposes. 
Multi-tier plans are plans that consist of different reward schemes for different members of the board under the same plan. 





Performance Plan Used in Executive Remuneration Contracts. 





Options LTIPs Other     
                  
None 13 62 203 382     
One Plan 422 294 186 51     
Two Plans 5 68 43 5     
More than 
Two 0 16 8 2     
Total 440 440 440 440     
                  
Panel B: Number of plans employed by firms, 
by plan and firm size      
 Annual Bonus Share Options LTIPs Other 
  Large Small Large Small Large Small Large  Small 
None 2 11 31 31 69 134 165 217 
One Plan 194 228 138 156 97 89 32 19 
Two Plans 4 1 26 42 28 15 2 3 
More than 
Two 0 0 5 11 6 2 1 1 
Total 200 240 200 240 200 240 200 240 
                  
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the number of plans used by firms the study. Executive remuneration plans of 
440 firms were analysed. Panel A presents the summary statistics of plans used. Panel B presents the number of annual bonus 
plans, share option plans, LTIPs and other plans respectively employed by firms in the sample for the year 2002/2003. Panel C 
presents the the number of annual bonus plans, share option plans, LTIPs and other plans employed by firms in the sample, 
categorised based on firm size. Large firms are firms that are ranked 1-200 by market capitalisation, and small firms are firms 
that are ranked 201-440 by market capitalisation. All plan data were collected from remuneration reports published in the 










Options LTIPs Other Total 
None 1 31 27 21 80 
One 389 378 192 34 993 
Two 13 48 56 5 122 
Not disclosed 29 20 17 8 74 
Total 432 477 292 68 1269 
Panel A presents the number of performance measures used in plans in annual bonus plans, share option plans, LTIPs and 







Types of Performance Measures Used in Executive Remuneration Plans. 
                           



















Bonus 1 37 78 4 106 6 4 1 1 178 29 445  
Sh. Options 31 305 7 14 6 11 96 30 1 4 20 525  
LTIPs 27 100 10 8 4 14 153 9 0 6 17 348  
Other 21 14 3 1 0 3 11 5 1 6 8 73  
Total 80 456 98 27 116 34 264 45 3 194 74 1391  
 
Table 4 presents the performance measures used in the plans. NoPerfMeas is no performance measures, for plans that do not use performance measures. EPS is earnings per share. Profit / 
earnings are profit and / or earnings performance measures. NAV is net asset value. Qual are qualitatively expressed accounting objectives. Oth(Accg) are other accounting measures such as 
EVA or cash flow. TSR is total shareholder return. Share Price are performance measures based on share price. Othr(Mkt) are other market based measures such as equity returns. Oth PerfMeas 




Performance Benchmarks Used in Executive Remuneration Plans. 
                   
Panel A: Benchmarks Employed, by Plan 
Type       
 None RPI Peer Budget Growth Other Undisc. 
Not 
Rel.  
Annual Bonus 56 14 11 82 4 13 264 1  
Share Options 2 270 104 31 36 9 43 30  
LTIPs 1 75 154 32 19 8 32 27  
Other 6 7 12 10 6 0 10 22  
  
Panel B: Benchmarks Employed, by Performance Measure 
 N one RPI Peer Budget Growth Other Undisc.   
EPS 5 339 15 28 46 6 17   
Profit / 
earnings 13 7 1 36 0 2 39   
Net Asset 
Value 0 7 14 1 3 1 1   
Qualitative 9 2 0 21 2 3 79   
Other 
Accounting 1 2 1 18 3 3 6   
TSR 0 3 233 7 4 3 14   
Share Price 1 5 11 14 6 7 1   
Other Market 0 0 1 2 0 0 0   
Panel A presents benchmarks employed by firms, by plan type and Panel B presents benchmarks employed by firms by performance measure. 
None is plans that do not use benchmarks. RPI is the retail price index. Peer is peer groups. Budget are firm budgeted figures. Growth are firm 
specific growth benchmarks. Other is a catch all for benchmarks that do not fit any of the other categories. Undisc are plans that do not disclose 





Analysis of Peer Groups Used as Benchmarks in Executive Remuneration Plans. 
 Panel A: Peer Group for Anglo American plc 
 
Company Core Business 
Stock Exchange 
Listing Notes     
BHP plc Mining 
London, 
Johannesburg 
   Vale do Rio Doce Mining New York 
   Freeport McMoran Copper Mining New York 
   
Rio Tinto Mining  
Australian, London, 
New York 
   Teck Cominco Mining New York, Toronto 
   
WMC Resources Mining Australian  Taken over by BHP  
Xstrata Mining London, Swiss 
   
M-Real Paper and Pulp Finnish Taken over by Sappi Ltd 
Sappi Ltd Paper and Pulp Johannesburg 
   Svenska Cellulosa 
Aktiebolaget SCA Paper and Pulp OMX 
   DS Smith Packaging London 
   
Hanson 
Building 
Materials London Taken over by Heidelberg Cement in 2007 
      
Panel B: Peer Group Type, By Plan       
 
Named Index Not Named 
Not 
Disclosed Total 
Annual Bonus 2 6 0 3 11 
Share Options 25 74 1 4 104 
LTIPS 73 71 5 5 154 
Others 3 7 0 2 12 
Panel A presents the Peer Group for Anglo American plc for 2002/2003, as disclosed in their remuneration report. 
Additional information about companies were obtained from their respective corporate websites. Panel B presents the 
different type of peer groups used by firms in plans as benchmarks, categorised by plans. Named refers to a named list of 
peer firms. Index refers to an identified index, whether existing FTSE indices or constructed by the firm based on existing 
indices. Not named refers to situations where firms allude to the use of a peer group of firms, but decline to name the firms 





Descriptive Statistics for Target and Performance Levels. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Targets, All Plans    







 tgtlwr 291 16.65% 7.70% 13.73% 15.53% 17.79% 
 tgtupr 103 32.55% 17.27% 21.46% 29.79% 38.79% 
 pastgr3 262 -15.65% 580.67% -17.58% 18.87% 50.67% 
 actgr3 203 122.35% 1463.20% -20.22% 22.25% 67.65% 
 expgr3 282 37.96% 76.09% 15.24% 25.60% 42.70% 
                
Panel B: Median earnings per share growth targets and performance,  by year 
Year 
No of 
plans* tgtlwr tgtupr Range pastgr3. expgr3 actgr3 
1994 5(1) 15.30% 11.00% - 20.19% 16.10% 35.52% 
1995 15(0) 15.26% - - 25.36% 13.43% 35.03% 
1996 13(2) 14.32% 32.66% 18.34% 38.98% 20.00% 37.43% 
1997 12(3) 14.13% 32.13% 18.00% 20.37% 16.57% 48.72% 
1998 17(4) 11.38% 21.38% 10.00% 39.39% 22.41% -2.93% 
1999 33(7) 15.53% 30.53% 15.00% 19.30% 25.78% 22.68% 
2000 48 (15) 15.46% 21.46% 6.00% 39.29% 38.20% 
-
26.08% 
2001 48(19) 16.73% 25.73% 9.00% 8.44% 28.79% 24.59% 
2002 51(23) 17.79% 32.79% 15.00% -1.06% 27.30% 47.21% 




Panel C: Median earnings per share growth targets and performance, by plan 
  
No of 
plans* tgtlwr tgtupr Range pastgr3. expgr3 actgr3 
Share Options 196(45) 15.53% 26.48% 10.95% 16.85% 25.32% 23.02% 
LTIPs 77(47) 15.46% 32.13% 16.67% 20.09% 25.96% 22.25% 
        
*Number of plans with upper thresholds in parantheses 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for plan targets and past, forecasted and realised performance for plans 
in the sample. Panel A presents the statistics for all plans. Panel B and C present the median earnings per share 
growth targets and performance, by year and by plan respectively.  tgtlwr is the lower threshold target set in 
plans, obtained from the remuneration report. tgtupr is the upper threshold target set in plans, obtained from the 
remuneration report. pastgr3 is the growth in eps for firms three years prior to plan introduction. expgr3 is the 
three-year EPS growth forecast from the year the plan is introduced. actgr3 is the realised eps growth three years 
after the plan is introduced. All past, forecasted and realised eps growth figures were obtained directly or adjusted 













       
    lwrpast lwrtact lwrftr uprpast upract uprftr 
Plans where target is 
greater than 130 93 77 51 28 45 
% (not including N/A) 49.62% 36.76% 28.52% 57.30% 33.73% 45.92% 
Plans where target is 
lower than 132 160 193 38 55 53 
% (not including N/A) 50.38% 63.24% 71.48% 42.70% 66.27% 54.08% 
Not Available  29 38 13 202 208 195 
Total  262 253 270 89 83 98 
          
Table 8 presents the attainability of targets relative to past, realised and forecasted eps growth. Columns 2, 3 and 
4 refer to lower threshold targets relative to past (lwrpast), realised (lwract) and forecasted (lwrftr) eps growth. 
Columns 5, 6 and 7 refer to the attainment of upper threshold targets relative to past (uprpast), realised (upract) 
and forecasted (uprftr) eps growth targets respectively. All past, forecasted and realised eps growth figures were 
obtained directly or adjusted from data from I/B/E/S.  
 
